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ABSTRACT
By allowing intermediate nodes to perform non-trivial operations
on packets, such as mixing data from multiple streams, network
coding breaks with the ruling store and forward networking para-
digm and opens a myriad of challenging security questions. Fol-
lowing a brief overview of emerging network coding protocols, we
provide a taxonomy of their security vulnerabilities, which high-
lights the differences between attack scenarios in which network
coding is particularly vulnerable and other relevant cases in which
the intrinsic properties of network coding allow for stronger and
more efficient security solutions than classical routing. Further-
more, we give practical examples where network coding can be
combined with classical cryptography both for secure communica-
tion and secret key distribution. Throughout the paper we identify
a number of research challenges deemed relevant towards the ap-
plicability of secure network coding in practical networks.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network Archi-
tecture and Design—Network Communications; C.2.2 [Computer-
Communication Networks]: Network Protocols—Applications;
E.3 [Data]: Data Encryption—Code Breaking; E.4 [Data]: Cod-
ing and Information Theory—Error Control Codes
General Terms
Fundamentals and Research Challenges
Keywords
network coding, network security, data confidentiality, Byzantine
attacks, secret key distribution
1. INTRODUCTION
Disruptive technologies are often at the heart of novel security
concerns and solutions. In the context of communication networks
and protocols, network coding [Ahlswede et al. 2000] offers an ar-
guably intriguing networking concept: data throughput and net-
work robustness can be considerably improved by allowing the in-
termediate nodes in a network to mix different data flows through
algebraic combinations of multiple datagrams.
This key idea, which clearly breaks with the standard store-and-
forward paradigm of current routing solutions, is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1. To exchange messages a and b, nodes A and B must route
their packets through node S. Clearly, the traditional scheme shown
on top would require four transmissions. However, if S is allowed
to perform network coding with simple XOR operations, as illus-










Figure 1: A typical example of wireless network coding.
transmission (instead of one transmission with b followed by an-
other one with a). By combining the received data with the stored
message, A which possesses a can recover b and B can recover a
using b. Thus, in this scenario, network coding saves one transmis-
sion. More sophisticated network coding protocols view packets
as a collection of symbols from a particular finite field and for-
ward linear combinations of these symbols across the network, thus
leveraging basic features of linear codes such as erasure correction
capability and well understood encoding and decoding algorithms.
The main goal of this survey paper is to present and discuss the
most salient aspects of network coding from the point of view of
network security. First, we provide a taxonomy of network cod-
ing vulnerabilities and attacks, and compare them against those of
state-of-the-art routing algorithms. Some emphasis shall be given
to active attacks, which can lead to severe degradation of network
coded information flows. Then, we show how to leverage the intrin-
sic properties of network coding for information security and secret
key distribution, in particular how to exploit the fact that nodes ob-
serve algebraic combinations of packets instead of the data packets
themselves. Although the prevalent design methodology for net-
work protocols views security as something of an add-on to be in-
cluded after the main communications tasks have been addressed,
we shall contend that the special characteristics of network coding
warrant a more comprehensive approach, namely one which gives
equal importance to security concerns. In the process, we elaborate
on a number of open problems for future research.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides an overview of currently available practical network cod-
ing schemes and proposes a simple classification for security pur-
poses. The main security challenges of network coding are ex-
plained in Section 3, followed by an overview of specific solutions,
which are presented in Section 4. The paper is concluded in Sec-
tion 5.
2. PRACTICAL NETWORK CODING
PROTOCOLS
Although network coding is a fairly recent technology, there ex-
ist already a number of protocol proposals which explore network
coding for higher throughput or robustness in various applications
and communication networks. From the point of view of network
security, it is useful to divide network coding protocols into two
main classes:
1. stateless network coding protocols, which do not rely on any
form of state information to decide when and how to mix
different packets in the sender queue;
2. state-aware network coding protocols, which rely on partial
or full network state information (e.g. buffer states of neigh-
boring nodes, network topology, or link costs) to compute a
network code or determine opportunities to perform network
coding in a dynamic fashion.
As shall be demonstrated in Section 3, the security vulnerabili-
ties of the protocols in the first and the second class are quite dif-
ferent from each other, most notably because the former require
state information and node identification to be disseminated in the
network and are thus more vulnerable to a wide range of imperson-
ation and control traffic attacks.
2.1 Stateless Network Coding Protocols
A representative for the first class, Random Linear Network Cod-
ing (RLNC) is a completely distributed methodology for combin-
ing different information flows [Ho et al. 2004]. The basic prin-
ciple is that each node in the network selects a set of coefficients
independently and randomly and then sends linear combinations of
the data symbols (or packets) it receives. Figure 2 illustrates the
linear operations carried out at intermediate node v (using integers
for simplicity). The symbols x, y and z denote the native packets,
which convey the information to be obtained at the receivers via
Gaussian elimination. P1 and P2 arrive at intermediate node v in
the network through its incoming links. P3, which is sent through
the only outgoing link of node v, is the result of a random linear
combination of P1 and P2 at node v, with chosen coefficients 1
and 2, respectively.
The global encoding vector, i.e. the matrix of coefficients which
holds the linear transformations that the original packet goes through
on its path from the source to the destination, is sent along in the
packet header to ensure that the end receivers are capable of decod-
ing the original data. Specifically, it was shown that if the coeffi-
cients are chosen at random from a large enough field, then Gaus-
sian elimination succeeds with overwhelming probability [Ho et al. 2003,
Ho et al. 2004]. It has also been shown that RLNC is capacity-
achieving, even on asynchronous lossy packet networks [Lun et al. 2005].
A framework for packetized network coding (Practical Network
Coding, PNC) is presented in [Chou et al. 2003], which leverages
RLNC’s resilience against disruptions such as packet loss, conges-
tion, and changes of topology, in order to guarantee robust com-
munication over highly dynamic networks with minimal (or no)
control information. The framework defines a packet format and a
buffering model. The packet format includes the global encoding
vector in its header. The payload of the packets is divided into vec-
tors according to the field size (28 or 216, i.e. each symbol has 8
or 16 bits, respectively). Each of these symbols is then used as a
building block for the linear operations performed by the nodes.
The buffering model divides the stream of packets into genera-
tions of size h, such that packets in the same generation are tagged
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Figure 2: An instance of random linear network coding.
with a common generation number. Each node sorts the incom-
ing packets in a single buffer according to their generation number.
When there is a transmission opportunity at an outgoing edge, the
sending node generates a new packet, which contains a random
linear combination of all packets in the buffer that belong to the
current generation. If a packet is non-innovative, i.e. if it does not
increase the rank of the decoding matrix available at the receiving
node, then it is immediately discarded. As soon as the matrix of
received packets has full rank, Gaussian elimination is performed
at the receivers to recover the original packets.
RLNC seems particularly beneficial in dynamic and unstable
networks – that is, networks where the structure or topology of
the network varies within a short time, such as mobile ad-hoc net-
works and peer-to-peer content distribution networks. The bene-
fits of RLNC in wireless environments with rare and limited con-
nectivity, either due to mobility or battery scarcity, are highlighted
in [Widmer and Boudec 2005], which proposes an algorithm aimed
at reducing the overhead of probabilistic routing algorithms with
applications in delay tolerant networks. Other RLNC based infor-
mation dissemination schemes that increase reliability and robust-
ness while reducing the incurred overhead can be found in [El Fawal et al. 2006,
Deb et al. 2005].
The potential impact of RLNC in content distribution networks
has been addressed in [Gkantsidis and Rodriguez 2005, Dimakis et al. 2007].
Since each node forwards a random linear combination indepen-
dently of the information present at other nodes, its operation is
completely decentralized. Moreover, when collecting a random
combination of packets from a randomly chosen node, there is high
probability of obtaining a linearly independent packet in each time.
Thus, the problem of redundant transmissions, which is typical of
traditional flooding approaches, is considerably reduced. In content
distribution applications, there is no need to download one particu-
lar fragment; instead, any linearly independent segment brings in-
novative information [Dimakis et al. 2007]. The practical scheme
proposed in [Gkantsidis and Rodriguez 2005] is designed for large
files and nodes make forwarding decisions solely based on local in-
formation. It is shown that network coding not only improves the
expected file download time, but also improves the overall robust-
ness of the system with respect to frequent changes in the network.
Acedanski et al [Acedanski et al. 2005] compare the performance
of network coding with traditional coding measures in a distributed
storage setting in which each storage location only has very lim-
ited storage space for each file and the objective is that a file-
downloader connects to as few storage locations as possible to re-
trieve a file. It is shown that RLNC performs well without the need
for a large amount of additional storage space required at a central-
ized server. Dimakis et al [Dimakis et al. 2007] investigate how to
engineer distributed storage systems from a coding perspective, in
particular for peer-to-peer scenarios. Their contribution includes a
general graph-theoretic framework for computing lower bounds on
the bandwidth required to maintain distributed storage architectures
and shows that RLNC achieves these lower bounds.
2.2 State-aware Network Coding Protocols
State-aware network coding protocols rely on the available state
information to optimize the coding operations carried out by each
node. The optimization process may target the throughput or the
delay (among other performance metrics). Its scope can be local
or global, depending on whether the optimization affects only the
operations within the close neighborhood of a node or addresses the
end-to-end communication across the entire network. For instance,
if control traffic is exchanged between neighbors, each node can
perform a local optimization to decide on the fly how to mix and
transmit the received data packets. One way to implement pro-
tocols with global scope is to use the polynomial time algorithm
of [Jaggi et al. 2005], which, given the network graph, is able to
determine the optimal network code prior to communication. By
exploiting the broadcast nature of the wireless medium and spread-
ing encoded information in a controlled manner, state-aware pro-
tocols promise considerable advantages in terms of throughput, as
well as resilience to node failures and packet losses. Efficiency
gains come mainly from the fact that nodes make use of every data
packet they overhear and, in some instances, also from a reduced
need for control information.
As an example, the COPE protocol [Katti et al. 2006] inserts a
coding layer between the IP and MAC layers for detecting coding
opportunities. More specifically, nodes overhear and store packets
that are exchanged within their radio range, and then send reception
reports to inform their neighbors about which packets they have
stored in their buffers. Based on these updates, each node computes
the optimal XOR mixture of multiple packets in order to reduce the
number of transmissions. It has been shown that this approach can
lead to strong improvements in terms of throughput and robustness
to network dynamics. The interplay of routing and network coding
is explored in [Toledo and Wang 2006, Sengupta et al. 2007].
3. SECURITY CHALLENGES
The aforementioned network coding protocols expect a well be-
haved node to obey the following rules:
• encode the received packets correctly, thus contributing to
the expected benefits of network coding;
• forward the encoded packets correctly, thus enabling the des-
tination nodes to retrieve the intended information;
• ignore data for which it is not the intended destination, thus
fulfilling basic confidentiality requirements.
In the case of state-aware network coding protocols, we must add
one more rule:
• participate in the timely dissemination of correct state in-
formation, thus contributing to a sound knowledge base for
network coding decisions.
It follows that an attack on a network coding based protocol must
result from one or more network nodes breaking one or more of
these basic rules.
In Table 1 we provide a taxonomy of security vulnerabilities and
their impact in both the traditional network paradigm and network
coding based protocols. Our goal is not to provide an exhaustive
list but rather to emphasize those that underline the effectiveness of
network coding based protocols in protecting against some typical
attacks on communication networks, and also those that may cause
considerable damage particularly to this type of protocols. Natu-
rally, the means to achieve a successful attack are of course highly
dependent on the specific rules of the protocol, and therefore it is
reasonable to distinguish between the aforementioned stateless and
state-aware classes of network coding schemes.
If properly applied, stateless network protocols based on RNLC
are potentially less subject to some of the typical security issues of
traditional routing protocols. First, stateless protocols do not de-
pend on exchange of topology or buffer state information, which
can be faked (e.g. through link spoofing attacks). Secondly, the
impact of traffic relay refusal is reduced, due to the inherent ro-
bustness that results from spreading the information by means of
network coding. Thirdly, the information retrieval depends solely
on the data received and not on the identity of nodes, which ensures
some protection against impersonation attacks.
In contrast, state-aware network coding protocols rely on vul-
nerable control information disseminated among nodes in order to
optimize the encodings. On one hand, this property renders them
particularly prone to attacks based on the generation of false con-
trol information. On the other hand, control traffic information can
also be used effectively against active attacks, such as the injection
of erroneous packets. For protocols with local scope, the nega-
tive impact of active attacks is limited to a confined neighborhood,
whereas with end-to-end network coding the consequences can be
much more devastating. Opportunistic network coding protocols,
which rely on the information overheard by neighboring nodes over
the wireless medium, are obviously more amenable to eavesdrop-
ping attacks than their wireline counterparts.
More generally, in comparison with traditional routing, the dam-
age caused by a malicious (Byzantine) node injecting corrupted
packets into the information flow is likely to be higher with net-
work coding, irrespective of whether a protocol is stateless or state-
aware. Since network coding relies on mixing the content of multi-
ple data packets, a single corrupted packet may very easily corrupt
the entire information flow from the sender to the destination at any
given time.
4. SECURING NETWORK CODING PRO-
TOCOLS
Having provided a security taxonomy evidencing the specific
vulnerabilities of network coding, we now turn our attention to
the next natural question, namely how to find appropriate mech-
anisms for securing network coding protocols. Our main goal here
is to show how the specific characteristics of network coding can
be leveraged to counter some of the threats posed by eavesdroppers
and Byzantine attackers. To further illustrate its security potential,
we include a mobile key distribution scheme in which network cod-
ing adds an extra line of defense.
4.1 Countering Eavesdropping Attacks
We shall start by presenting countermeasures against passive at-
tacks, with special emphasis on three different scenarios. First, we
shall consider nice but curious nodes, which do not break any of the
established rules except for not ignoring the data for which they are
not the intended receivers. In the second instance, the eavesdropper
is able to wiretap a subset of network links. Finally, the third type
Table 1: Security vulnerabilities of Stateless and State-Aware Network Coding (NC) Protocols in Comparison with Traditional Routing





By generating routing messages
pretending to be another node, the
attacker can introduce conflicting
routes or routing loops, and cause
network partitioning.
Stateless NC protocols do not rely on
the identity of the nodes for any
operation, therefore they are not
affected.
State-aware NC protocols rely on
network nodes for state information







By generating routing messages with
false information (e.g. announcing
small distances to nodes that are far
away), the attacker can cause
degradation of communications and
traffic interception.
Stateless NC protocols can be affected
in terms of the gains obtained and the
processing time by the injection of
erroneous packets into the information
flow.
State-aware NC protocols are also
prone to this type of attack. If, on one
hand, one extra type of information
(control traffic) can be targeted, on the
other hand, that same information
may be used to provide a faster
detection of such attacks and prevent
disemination of bogus packets.
Byzantine
Modification
A node modifies the
messages in transit.
By changing the header fields of
messages passed among nodes
(e.g. the destination node), the
attacker can cause traffic subversion
and denial of service.
Stateless NC protocols can be affected
by changes in the coded packets in
transit, in particular by changes in the
coefficients and/or the encoded
payload which may render the native
packets undecodable.
State-aware NC protocols can be
affected by changes on either the
coded data packets or the control
packets. Also here the control packets









By sending “old” routing messages,
outdated, conflicting and/or wrong
information enters the network which
may cause defective routing.
Stateless NC protocols can be affected
in terms of NC gain and processing
time by the injection of erroneous
packets which are repeated into the
information flow.
State-aware NC protocols can be
affected by changes on either the
coded data packets or the control
packets. Also here the control packets
can possibly help in addressing these
attacks.
Blackhole
A node refuses to relay
traffic on behalf of
others.
The attacker can cause denial of
service and degradation of
communications.
Stateless NC protocols can be affected
by degradation of communications
however they benefit from the
inherent redundancy of NC enabling
increased robustness and improved
probability of successful
delivery [Ho et al. 2004].
State-aware NC protocols can be
affected by degradation of
communications, but can possibly







however they try to
acquire as much
information as possible.
By looking at every message that a
node is expected to relay, the attacker
can get access to classified
information.
If an intermediate node has access to a
sufficient number of linearly
independent combinations of packets,
it can decode them and have access to
all of the sent information.
State-aware NC protocols are also
prone to eavesdropping threats.
Control traffic may be used both to
prevent as well as potentiate this type
of attack.
of attacker is a worst-case eavesdropper who is given full access to
all the traffic in the network.
4.1.1 Nice But Curious Nodes
Consider first a threat model in which the network consists en-
tirely of nice but curious nodes, i.e. they comply with the commu-
nication protocols (in that sense, they are well-behaved) but may
try to acquire as much information as possible from the data flows
that pass through them (in which case, they are potentially ill in-
tended). Under this scenario, stateless protocols that exploit the
RLNC scheme described in Section 2 possess an intrinsic security
feature [Lima et al. 2007]: depending on the size of the code alpha-
bet and the topology of the network it is in many instances unlikely
that an intermediate node will have enough degrees of freedom to
perform Gaussian elimination and gain access to the transmitted
data set.
Based on this observation, it is possible to characterize the threat
level posed by an intermediate node according to an algebraic se-
curity criterion [Lima et al. 2007] that takes into account the num-
ber of components of the global encoding vector it receives. In the
example of Figure 3, which uses integers for simplicity, the up-
per (uncoded) transmission scheme leaves partial data unprotected,
whereas in the lower (network coding) scheme the intermediate
nodes 2 and 3 are not able to recover the data symbols.
4.1.2 Wiretapping Nodes
A different threat model, commonly found in the recent litera-
ture on secure network coding, assumes that one or more exter-
nal eavesdroppers (or wiretappers) have access to a subset of the
available communication links. The crux of the problem is then
to find code constructions capable of splitting the data among dif-
ferent links in such a way that reconstruction by the attackers is
either very difficult or impossible. Under this assumption, it was
shown in [Cai and Yeung 2002], that there exist secure linear net-
work codes that achieve perfect information-theoretic secrecy for
single source multicast. In [Cai and Yeung 2007], these results are
generalized to multi-source linear network codes by using the al-
gebraic structure of such codes to derive necessary and sufficient
conditions for their security. Furthermore, [Yeung and Cai 2008]
goes on to prove the optimality of a secure network code pro-
posed in [Cai and Yeung 2002]. More specifically, it is shown that
the constructed code maximizes the amount of secure multicasted
information while minimizing the necessary amount of random-
ness. The contribution of [Silva and Kschischang 2008] consists
of a coding scheme that can achieve the maximum possible rate of
n−µ information theoretically secure packets, where n is the num-
ber of packets from source to each receiver and µ is the number of
links that the wiretapper can observe. This can be applied on top
of any communication network without requiring any knowledge of
the underlying network code and without imposing any coding con-
straints. The basic idea is to use a "nonlinear" outer code, which is
linear over an extension field Fqm , and to exploit the benefits of this
extension field. Some contributions propose a different criterion in
which a system is deemed to be secure if an eavesdropper is unable
to get any uncoded or immediately decodable (also called mean-
ingful) source data [Bhattad and Narayanan 2005]. Other contri-
butions exploit the network topology to ensure that an attacker is
unable to get any meaningful information and add a cost function
to the secure network coding problem. The problem then becomes
finding a coding scheme that minimizes both the network cost and
the probability that the attacker is able to retrieve all the messages
of interest [Tan and Médard 2006].
Since state-aware network coding protocols with local code opti-
mization (e.g. COPE [Katti et al. 2006]) expect neighboring nodes
to be able to decode all the packets they receive, confidentiality
must be ensured by means of end-to-end encryption.
4.1.3 Worst-Case Eavesdroppers
In this case, the threat model is one in which the attacker has
access to all the packets traversing the network but not to the se-
cret keys shared among legitimate communicating parties. SPOC
(Secure Practical Network Coding) [Vilela et al. 2008] is a light -
weight security scheme for confidentiality in RLNC which pro-
vides a simple yet powerful way to exploit the inherent security
of RLNC in order to reduce the number of cryptographic opera-
tions required for confidential communication. This is achieved
by protecting (or “locking”) only the source coefficients required
to decode the linearly encoded data, while allowing intermediate
nodes to run their network coding operations by the means of “un-
locked” coefficients which provably do not compromise the hidden
data. The latter set of coefficients stores the operations performed
along the network upon the packet.
Seeking to evaluate the level of security provided by SPOC, [Lima et al. 2008]
analyzes the mutual information between the encoded data and the
two components that can lead to information leakage, namely the
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Figure 3: Example of algebraic security. The top scheme dis-
closes data to intermediate nodes, whereas the bottom scheme
can be deemed algebraically secure.
analysis, which is independent of any particular cypher used for
locking the coefficients, assumes that the encoding matrices are
based on variants of random linear network coding and can only be
accessed by the source and sinks. The results, some of which hold
even with finite block lengths, prove that information-theoretic se-
curity is achievable for any field size without loss in terms of decod-
ing probability. In other words, since correlation attacks based on
the encoded data become impossible, protecting the encoding ma-
trix is generally sufficient to ensure the confidentiality of network
coded data.
4.2 Countering Byzantine Attacks
Although Byzantine attacks can have a severe impact on the in-
tegrity of network coded information, the specific properties of lin-
ear network codes can be used effectively to counteract the im-
pairments caused by traffic relay refusal or injection of erroneous
packets. In particular, RLNC has been shown to be very robust to
packet losses induced by node misbehavior [Lun et al. 2005]. More
sophisticated countermeasures, which modify the format of coded
packets, can be subdivided into two main categories: (1) end-to-
end error correction, and (2) misbehavior detection, which can be
carried out either packet by packet or in generation based fashion.
4.2.1 End-to-end error correction
The main advantage of end-to-end error-correcting codes is that
the burden of applying error control techniques is left entirely to the
source and the destinations, such that intermediate nodes are not re-
quired to change their mode of operation. The typical transmission
model for end-to-end network coding is well described by a matrix
channel Y = AX + Z, where X corresponds to the matrix whose
rows are the transmitted packets, Y is the matrix whose rows are
the received packets, Z denotes the matrix corresponding to the in-
jected error packets after propagation over the network, and A de-
scribes the transfer matrix, which corresponds to the global linear
transformation operated on packets as they traverse the network.
In terms of performance, error-correction schemes can correct up
to the min-cut between the source and the destinations. Rank-
metric error-correcting codes in RLNC under this setting appear
in [Koetter and Kschischang 2007] and the results are extended in [Silva et al. 2007,
Silva and Kschischang 2007] for the scenario in which the channel
may supply partial information about erasures and deviations from
the sent information flow. Still under the same setting, [Silva et al. 2008]
considers a probabilistic error model for random network coding,
provides bounds on capacity and presents a simple coding scheme
with polynomial complexity that achieves capacity with exponen-
tially low probability of failure with respect to both the packet
length and the field size. [Montanari and Urbanke 2007] extends [Koetter and Kschischang
and provides an error-correction scheme based on random sparse
graphs and a low-complexity decoding algorithm for a probabilistic
error model. Bounds on the maximum achievable rate in an adver-
sarial setting are provided by [Cai and Yeung 2003], which derives
generalizations of the Hamming and Gilbert-Varshamov bounds.
A somewhat different approach to network error correction is
considered in [Jaggi et al. 2007], which proposes robust network
codes that have polynomial-time complexity and attain optimal rates
in the presence of active attacks. The basic idea is to regard the
packets injected by an adversarial node as a second source of infor-
mation and adding enough redundancy to allow the destination to
distinguish between relevant and erroneous packets. The achieved
capacity depends on the rate at which the attacker can obtain infor-
mation, as well as on the existence of a shared secret between the
source and the sinks. This work is extended in [Nutman and Langberg 2008],
which introduces three additional adversarial models and gives op-
timal rates C − z for each, where C is the network capacity and z
is the number of links controlled by an attacker.
4.2.2 Misbehavior Detection
Generation-based detection schemes generally offer similar ad-
vantages as network error-correcting codes in that the often compu-
tationally expensive task of detecting the modifications introduced
by Byzantine attackers is carried out by the destination nodes. The
main disadvantage of generation-based detection schemes is that
only nodes with enough packets from a generation are able to detect
malicious modifications, and thus, usage of such detection schemes
can result in large end-to-end delays. [Ho et al. 2004] proposes an
information-theoretic framework for detecting Byzantine attackers.
The underlying assumption is that the attacker cannot see the full
rank of the packets in the network. It is shown that a hash scheme
with polynomial complexity can be used without the need for se-
cret key distribution. However, the use of a block code forces an a
priori decision on the coding rate.
The key idea of packet-based detection schemes is that some of
the intermediate nodes in the network can detect polluted data on
the fly and drop the corresponding packets, thus retransmitting only
valid data. However, packet-based detection schemes require ac-
tive participation of intermediate nodes and are dependent on hash
functions, which are generally computationally expensive. Alter-
natively, this type of attacks can be mitigated by signature schemes
based on homomorphic hash functions. The use of homomorphic
hash functions is specifically tailored for network coding schemes,
since the hash of a coded packet can be easily derived from the
hashes of previously encoded packets, thus enabling intermediate
nodes to verify the validity of encoded packets prior to mixing them
algebraically. Unfortunately, homomorphic hash functions are also
computationally expensive.
[Charles et al. 2006] proposes a homomorphic signature scheme
for network coding which is based on Weil pairing in elliptic curve
cryptography. Homomorphic hash functions are also considered in
the context of peer to peer content distribution with rateless erasure
codes for multicast transfers in [Krohn et al. 2004]. With the goal
of preventing both the waste of large amounts of bandwidth and
the pollution of download caches of network clients, each file is
compressed to a smaller hash value, with which receivers can check
the integrity of downloaded blocks. Beyond its independence from
the coding rate, the main advantage of this process is that it is less
computationally expensive for large files than traditional forward
error correction codes (such as Reed-Solomon codes).
One of the contributions of [Gkantsidis and Rodriguez 2006] is
a cooperative security scheme for on-the-fly detection of malicious
blocks injected in network coding based peer-to-peer networks. In
order to reduce the cost of verifying information on-the-fly while
efficiently preventing the propagation of malicious blocks, the au-
thors propose a distributed mechanism where every node performs
block checks with a certain probability and alerts its neighbors
when a suspicious block is found. Techniques to prevent denial of
service attacks due to the dissemination of alarms are also included
in [Gkantsidis and Rodriguez 2006].
In [Zhao et al. 2007] the basic idea is to take advantage of the
fact that in linear network coding any valid packet transmitted be-
longs to the subspace spanned by the original set of vectors. A
signature scheme is thus used to check that a given packet belongs
to the original subspace. Generating a signature that is not in the
subspace yet passes the check is shown to be hard.
A comparison of the bandwidth overhead required by Byzantine
error correction and detection schemes is provided in [Kim et al. 2008].
The intermediate nodes are divided into regular nodes and trusted
nodes, and only the latter are given access to the public key of the
Byzantine detection scheme in use. Under these assumptions, it
is shown that packet-based detection is most competitive when the
probability of attack is high, whereas a generation-based approach
is the more bandwidth efficient when the probability of attack is
low.
4.3 Key Distribution Schemes
The ability to distribute secret keys in a secure manner is an obvi-
ous fundamental requirement towards assuring cryptographic secu-
rity. In the case of highly constrained mobile ad-hoc and sensor net-
works, key pre-distribution schemes [Eschenauer and Gligor 2002]
emerge as a strong candidate, mainly because they require consid-
erably less computation and communication resources than trusted
party schemes [Perrig et al. 2002] or public-key infrastructures [Malan et al. 2004].
The main caveat is that secure connectivity can only be achieved in
probabilistic terms, i.e. if each node is loaded with a sufficiently
large number of keys drawn at random from a fixed pool, then with
high probability it will share at least one key with each one of its
neighboring nodes.
The contributions in [Oliveira et al. 2007] show that network cod-
ing can be an effective tool for establishing secure connections be-
tween low-complexity sensor nodes. In contrast with pure key pre-
distribution schemes, it is assumed that a mobile node, e.g. a hand-
held device or a laptop computer, is available for activating the
network and for helping to establish secure connections between
nodes. By exploiting the benefits of network coding, it is possible
to design a secret key distribution scheme that requires only a small
number of pre-stored keys, yet ensures that shared-key connectivity
is established with probability one and that the mobile node is prov-
ably oblivious to the distributed keys [Oliveira et al. 2007]. The
basic idea of the protocol, which is illustrated in Fig. 4, can be
summarized in the following tasks:
(a) prior to sensor node deployment:
1. a large pool P of N keys and their N identifiers are
generated off-line;
2. a different subset of L keys drawn randomly from P
and the corresponding L identifiers are loaded into the
memory of each sensor node;
3. a table is constructed with the N key identifiers and N
sequences that result from performing an XOR of each
key with a common protection sequence X;
4. the table is stored in the memory of the mobile node;
(b) after sensor node deployment:
1. the mobile node broadcasts HELLO messages that are
received by any sensor node within wireless transmis-
sion range;
2. each sensor node replies with a key identifier;
3. based on the received key identifiers the mobile node
locates the corresponding sequences protected by X
and combines them through an XOR network coding
operation, thus canceling X and obtaining the XOR of
the corresponding keys;
4. the mobile node broadcasts the resulting XOR sequence;
5. by combining the received XOR sequence with its own
key, each node can easily recover the key of its neighbor
node, thus sharing a pair of keys which is kept secret
from the mobile node.
Although the use of network coding hereby presented is limited to
XOR operations, more powerful secret key distribution schemes are














Figure 4: Secret key distribution scheme. Sensor nodes A and
B want to exchange two keys via an mobile node S. The pro-
cess is initiated by an HELLO message broadcasted by S. Upon
receiving this message, each sensor node sends back a key iden-
tifier i(·) corresponding to one of its keys Ki(·). Node S then
broadcasts the result of the XOR of the two keys Ki(A)⊕Ki(B).
Once this process is concluded, sensor nodesA andB can com-
municate using the two keys Ki(A) and Ki(B) (one in each di-
rection). Here, EKi(A)(mA→B) denotes a message sent by A to
B, encrypted with Ki(A), and EKi(B)(mB→A) corresponds to
a message sent by B to A, encrypted with Ki(B).
5. CONCLUSIONS
Motivated by the recent surge in network coding research and
its applications, we discussed the security implications of stateless
and state-aware network coding protocols in comparison with com-
mon routing solutions. By exploiting the intrinsic properties of
network coding, most notably the algebraic dependency between
packets and the possibility of information dissemination along mul-
tiple paths, it is possible to find natural lightweight solutions for
distributing keys and ensuring confidentiality against eavesdrop-
pers. The most serious security challenges posed by network cod-
ing thus seem to come from various types of Byzantine attacks,
which target either the control traffic or the network code itself and
demand more sophisticated security solutions than those currently
in place.
Open problems include how to construct and maintain network
topologies that are particularly robust against Byzantine attacks on
network coding (as pursued e.g. in [D. Wang and Kschischang 2007]
via limited broadcast), how to combine network coding and cryp-
tographic primitives in the most effective way, how to exploit the
properties of network coding for anonymous communication (e.g.along
the lines of the information slicing approach proposed in [Katti et al. 2007]),
and how to leverage network coding for secure multi-party compu-
tation.
As network coding protocols continue to flourish and thrive, ad-
dressing the aforementioned concerns is likely to yield a consider-
able number of research opportunities in network coding security.
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